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The financial and economic crisis of 2008 revealed lack of tools and inefficiency of methods used by regulators of leading 
states to predict and prevent crisis of global proportions. In this regard, national and supranational regulators are trying to 
introduce new principles for regulation of financial services markets, based on the philosophy of macro-prudential regulation. 
The paper presents a comparative analysis of institutions and methods of regulation in the USA, UK and European Union. The 
authors critically analyze the effectiveness of new models of regulators, questioning the benefits of new ones in comparison 
with previous. They emphasize the necessity to reform not only institutional structure of regulators but methodology of their 
activities too, as well as, the absence of universal prescription of reforms, coming to conclusion, that each country must choose 
its own, based on their legal traditions, regulatory system. 
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Development of modern principles of regulation arising in the financial services markets was influenced by the complex 
global economic process of the twentieth century. The impetus for the formation of the legislation on securities was the 
financial crisis of 1929. For instance, as said Bernanke: ‘To understand the Great Depression is the Holy Grail of 
macroeconomics.’[1] Three legislative acts as a response to the financial crisis of 1929-1934 reformed the financial 
market in the USA. The principles underpinning these acts have provided formation of stable financial market and 
influenced on the development of European legislation [2]. First of all, it was the Glass-Steagal Act of 1933, which 
separated investment and commercial banking. Secondly, it was the Securities Act of 1933, which regulated the issuance 
of new securities. Thirdly, it was the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which regulated issued securities; for instance, 
prohibition of insider trading [3]; and established the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In turn, the SEC is a 
special state body responsible for the securities market and subordinated directly to the President of the USA. This 
Commission established the procedure of accessing to the conduct of professional activities on the securities market, 
carrying out the control over the activities of brokers, dealers, asset managers and other professional members providing 
services to third parties. Access to professional services could be obtained on the basis of the license or through 
membership in self-regulatory organizations or stock exchanges. In addition, the SEC was responsible for registration of 
securities, primarily stocks and bonds, which had to be sold to the public. In other words, the American ‘post-Great 
Depression’ legislation created the framework of micro-prudential regulation, which was progressive and efficient until the 
2008 financial crisis. 
 
2. Development of Modern Principles of Financial Regulation 
 
Despite some criticism of establishing a regulator of securities from proponents of ‘light touch’ regulation [4], these 
principles have defined the framework of state regulation of the financial market. Moreover, it can be stated that these 
principles are almost universal and found reflection in the EU directives and national legal acts of the EU Member States 
[5]. However, by setting stringent requirement in respect of the procedure of issue of securities held for proposals to 
public, the legislative may provide for a more liberal regulatory regime in respect of other financial instruments. For 
instance, it may be securities held for offer to professional participants of the financial market [6]. These persons usually 
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referred to as ‘qualified investors’ that include professional participants of the securities market, such as asset 
management companies of investment funds or credit organizations. It is assumed that these organizations have ability to 
properly and adequately assess the risks associated with investments in instruments that are not registered in the 
authorized state body. Moreover, the state establishing special requirements for professional securities market 
participants also has the ability to keep them from being too risky, thereby protecting their clients – investors. After all, 
violations of investors’ rights undermine the credibility of the national financial market, destabilizing it. This approach 
determines the ratio of civil law norms and special administrative norms regulating legal relations that arise in financial 
markets. Hence, this balance of self-regulation or decentralization and state or centralized regulation depends on the 
legal traditions and understanding of the nature of law. For instance, in civil law countries, it is more centralized 
regulation. In contrast, in common law countries, it is more decentralized regulation. However, the last financial debacle 
shifted regulation towards more centralization. 
 Compliance with requirements relating to the securities and financial instruments held for qualified investors has 
become a worldwide practice. Undesirable effects occur not only for purchasers of securities but primarily for professional 
market participants. As noted in the report of the group investigating the causes of the 2008 crisis, regulation should 
become more intelligent and not allowing to go on about professional investors [7]. In the world practice, there is a 
prohibition for professional market participants to offer financial instruments to non-qualified investors. In the USA the 
rules of issue and distribution of securities intended for qualified investors were established under the Securities Act of 
1933 rule 144-A [8],[9],[10]. Meanwhile, in the UK self-regulation prevailed until 1987, when Financial Services Act of 
1986 came into force [11]. Such regulation exists in the EU too. In particular, the distribution of the securities by means of 
offering them to the qualified investors is carried out by means of direct indication that the paper should fulfill the 
requirements of EC Directive 2003/71/EC [12] establishing the compulsory registration of prospectuses of securities. The 
prospectus of the relevant type of securities is prohibited to offer this security to unqualified investors. However, the 
current financial market with modern policies of complicated financial instruments and massive and interconnected 
financial institutions demands a new level of regulation, a macro level. 
Modern system of macro-prudential regulation. Current system of financial regulation is unable to provide managed 
volatility of the financial market. Consequently, achieving relative stability of functioning of financial institutions is a very 
relevant question. Events at the world financial markets will make one to rethink the basic concepts and hypotheses of 
the system of financial regulation [13], particularly issues related to systemic risk posed by ‘too big to fail’ financial 
institutions. Moreover, modern financial and economic markets are characterized as a global complex open system. In 
other words, when a fault occurs in one of the elements of this system, problems can spread throughout the system and 
may lead to stagnation of the system as a whole. 
 
2.1 Models of macro-prudential supervision 
 
To keep control over the development of world and national financial systems and prevent further systemic crises, leading 
world states focused on macro-prudential regulation and supervision. Simplifying, it is ‘to help prevent the build-up of 
bubbles’ [14]. For instance, to provide macro-prudential regulation the USA, the UK and the EU created new systemic risk 
agencies: the Financial Stability Oversight Board (FSOC), the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) and the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) respectively. Thus, as a response to financial crisis the leading states changed rules and 
institutional structures of financial regulation [15]. In addition, it would be better if these high-level financial supervisors 
were compatible and collaborated to each other [16]. These decisions are based on the already proved its fallacy opinion 
of the leading countries that to deal with the crisis is enough to have a regulatory system.  
Modification of the system of macro-prudential analysis is expressed in the rejection of the model of a ‘single 
regulator’, which has proven inability to regulate the threats of the market, because of lack attention to the ‘issues of 
systemic risk, systemically significant firms and systemic resilience’ [17], in favor of ‘twin peaks’ model (for instance, the 
UK). This separation of functions enables greater concentration on particular management objectives. For instance, it can 
be management of systemic risk or protection of the consumers and investors rights separately. This innovation is aimed 
to reduce overlapping of functions and risk of competition targets inside the regulatory body. Thus, it can be expected 
increasing of the efficiency of response to emerging threats. However, the offered model may contribute to regulatory 
arbitrage between different sectors of the financial market. 
In addition, it cannot be excluded that risks will concentrate in the less regulated sectors of economy. This fact is of 
particular importance because uncontrolled growth of risky assets of the least regulated financial operators in the USA is 
a result of active trade in the market of financial derivative instruments. Similarly, these uncontrolled derivatives became 
one of the causes of the last financial crunch, which spread to the entire global financial and economic system [18]. It is 
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therefore pertinent to state that, in the world practice there is no a universal model of the macro-prudential system of 
regulation. It can be explained by different legal traditions and understanding of the nature of law. Thus, currently, each 
country seeks and accepts its own, sometimes different, approaches. These solutions are based on the adoption of 
international experience of the established legal and institutional system of the country. 
 
2.1.1 The USA model 
 
The USA, in accordance with the Dodd-Frank Act [19], holds the most radical reforming of financial regulation since the 
Great Depression [20]. This is understandable, since the scale of the recent crisis comparable with the crisis of the first 
third of the twentieth century. The only difference is in the nature of crises. The recent one is a banking or credit crisis, 
while, the Great Depression was a stock-market crisis [21]. In connection with that, the Dodd-Frank Act requires changes 
in the current institutional structure for regulation of financial system by more centralization [22]. It provides a system of 
supervision and monitoring systemic risks to ‘re-impose controls’ [23]. The main aim of the Act is ‘To promote the 
financial stability of the United States…, to end ‘too big to fail’ [24]. It moves in the direction of strengthening of control 
over systemically important companies. For instance, the Act addresses special leverage ratios on SIFIs [25]. In addition, 
regulators get power for the rehabilitation and liquidation of problematic financial companies, which can be risky for the 
financial stability of the USA. It is particular important including in the scope of regulation non-banking financial institutions 
and other companies which are the parts of the holding and, consequently, can bear risks for the whole financial system.  
However, in spite of having progressive ideas, the Dodd-Frank Act was criticized for being lengthy and complicated 
[26]. Similarly, Baber states that the Dodd-Frank Act ‘have been finalized too quickly, without a full review of the potential 
implications within the financial sector’ [27]. Moreover, currently, it is quite difficult to state the full compliance of new 
legislative initiatives to the goals of reforms. For instance, the Act does not contain instruments of size decreasing of ‘too 
big to fail’ institutions [28]. Consequently, in the case of crisis the government will bail-out big banks again [29],[30]. This 
policy laid the groundwork for future crises by reducing financial discipline and formation expectations of mandatory SIFIs 
support [31]. As a result, the problem of ‘too big to fail’ is unresolved and the probability of potential financial crises is not 
minimized.  
 
2.1.2 The UK model 
 
In the UK, the regulatory reforms lead to building more centralized system of regulation. The policy of transition to the 
new structure of macro-prudential regulation is based on the ideas of accounting of individual behavior for regulation 
[32],[33]. The tripartite system of regulation: The Financial Services Authority (FSA), Bank of England, HM Treasury, is 
replaced by a new structure, consisting of: Financial Policy Committee (FPC), Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). In comparison with the previous ones, the credentials of new regulators are broader. 
For instance, FPC, a committee of the Court of the Bank of England, is responsible for protection the stability of the 
financial system in general, or macro-prudential regulation [34]. The activities of the PRA, a subsidiary of the Bank of 
England, aim at reducing the risks of the financial system by ensuring safe and reliable functioning of the regulated 
companies, or micro-prudential regulation [35]. FCA, independent regulator, is responsible for the protection and 
improvement of confidence in the UK financial system through the control over the market infrastructure and regulation of 
the conduct of agents and companies on banking, investment and insurance markets, which are not subject to regulation 
under PRA, and following a new trend in regulation is going to apply more interventionist approach in comparison with the 
FSA, which used more preventive approach [36].  
However, Hudson [37] reasonably criticizes the new tripartite system for great opportunity of overlapping functions 
of micro-prudential regulation and conduct of business. Moreover, during the last financial crisis all former three bodies 
claimed each others for not predicting and preventing of the crisis. Currently, the conception of the regulation has not 
changed [38]. Thus, the rationale of the new system is quite unclear. In addition, there is doubt about the profitability of 
such significant transformations. In contrast, the previous system was relatively developed, but the new one will have to 
be tested; and it is unknown how it will resist a stressful situation [39],[40]. Thus, it seems that new system solely 
increases the level of bureaucracy, but methods of regulation have not been changed.  
 
2.1.3 The European Union model 
 
On 22 September 2010, the European Parliament approved a plan of reforming of the EU financial regulation system. 
This reform is aimed at ensuring the sustainability and stability of the financial system through the improvement of the 
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institutional structure of regulation, elimination of problems of fragmentation of individual risk analyses at the national 
levels, development of the system for early detection and prevention of the emergence of systemic risks. However, in 
spite of being relatively simple, a European model is more practical in comparison with mentioned above systems. Also, 
like the previous models, it focuses on expanding of macro-prudential supervision on the entire financial system. For this 
reason, in December 2010 it was created a new independent body, European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) [41], which is 
responsible for macro-prudential supervision of the whole EU financial system. Moreover, ESRB coordinates the activities 
of the three main European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs). That is European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 
[42], European Banking Authority (EBA) [43], European Insurance and Pensions Authority (EIOPA) [44].  
The main purpose of this institute is to prevent or mitigate systemic risks in order to ensure financial stability in the 
EU or at least to limit the distribution of the financial turmoil in the region. First practical results of the ESRB work are the 
development of methodological bases of the institute’s work, providing monitoring and stress tests of the European 
markets with the aim of identifying, prohibiting and preventing potential systemic risks and the development on their 
bases programs of measures of risks elimination. Unlike the policies implemented in the USA and UK models of hard 
regulation, the EU applies a policy of soft law. In other words, in case of detection of risks in the financial system regulator 
uses tools such as warnings and recommendations. In comparison to the UK, the EU is more actively involved in the 
regulation of hedge funds, private equity funds, rating agencies and over-the-counter derivatives market [45]. This is 
explainable by the fact that it is impossible to overestimate the negative contribution of these institutions in the 
development of the last financial crisis, for example the impact of activities of such SIFI, as AIG [46]. In comparison with 
the Dodd-Frank Act, Baber underlines a more ‘sincere and comprehensive approach to contain the consequences of the 
collapse and to establish an effective and fair supervisory regime in the future’ [47].  
However, the ECRB is only theoretically independent body. Practically, it is embedded into European Central Bank 
(ECB), which could neither prevent no predict the last financial crunch [48]. For this reason, it seems that close 
relationship of these bodies will not be productive in preventing future financial crises. Secondly, in spite of having 
advantages of implementing the soft law, in case of emergency it will be rather difficult to force national authority to 
comply with ECRB and will become less legal and more political process [49]. Moreover, a complex system of 
coordination and policy making in the EU framework is the reason for the lack of responsiveness to perceived threats 
[50]. This problem is not new and it was tried to cope since 1963, when Segre in his report underlined the importance of 
integration of the European financial markets. 
 
2.1.4 Background of the EU financial regulation  
 
2.1.4.1 Segre report 
 
The main purpose of the Segre Committee’s study was to identify the factors necessary for the development of the 
European financial market [51]. The report clearly drew emphasis on the importance of integration of the European 
financial market [52]. In order to implement the proposals of the Segre Committee on trade in securities and on the legal 
basis of the Rome Treaty, from 1972 to 1982, three directives were adopted: Directive 79/279/EEC [53], Directive 
80/390/EEC [54] and Directive 82/121/EEC [55]. Later in 1985 the White Paper from the Commission to the European 
Council, it was noted that to achieve integration there is a need of liberalization of financial activity [56]. However, the 
Committee stated that regulation should be in the national jurisdictions; and, this legal separation would help to increase 
liquidity in financial market [57]. In other words, ‘the European Commission committed itself to the concept of minimum 
harmonization.’ [58] In 1988, due to the lack of regulation at the national level, Directive 88/627/EEC was adopted [59]. 
The main purpose of this Directive was to protect the investor through the provision of adequate information. Further, in 
1989, Directive 89/298/EEC aimed to ensure availability of information on securities [60]. Then, to prevent insider dealing 
Directive 89/592/EEC was adopted [61]. Finally, to protect investor, Directive 93/22/EEC introduced the concept of 
‘prudential rules’ [62]. These rules require the keeping of records of transactions and investors’ notification. In 1999 in 
order to further integration of the European market the Commission in its Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) [63] 
proposed to introduce the single European currency [64], as well as, to organize a securities committee [65].  
 
2.1.4.2 Lamfalussy process 
 
On 9 November 2000, the Committee, led by Lamfalussy, published an initial report [66] which criticized the slowness of 
the legislative process [67]. In particular, it was pointed on the significant difference of the EU Members’ rules [68]. On 15 
February 2001, the Committee published a final report [69] which outlined the measures needed to expedite the 
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legislative process [70],[71]. These measures were called Lamfalussy process and consisted of four-level [72] system 
[73]. First, it is development of framework directives. Second, it is technical execution of these directives. For this reason, 
and to perform advisory functions a Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) [74] was organized. In 
addition, the CESR was responsible for improving the collaboration of the national supervisory bodies. Later, in order to 
meet modern principles of regulation, in 2003-2004, the Committee adopted four directives: the Market Abuse Directive 
(MAD, 2003), the Prospectus Directive (PD, 2003), the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID, 2004) and the 
Transparency Directive (TD, 2004), which are currently the legal basis of European capital markets. Directive MAD 
2003/6/EC [75] was adopted to prevent manipulation and insider dealing. Directive PD 2003/71/EC [76] regulates the 
requirements for the prospectus necessary for the issuance of securities. Directive 2004/39/EC [77] (MiFID) establishes 
framework for market organization and prudential rules for investment firms. Directive 2004/109/EC [78] (TD) is devoted 
to the issues of coordination of the transparency requirements of issuer information. Further, on 30 April 2004, to 
harmonize European takeover legislation, Directive 2004/25/EC [79] (TOD) was adopted. In 2005, the Commission 
proposed in its Green Paper [80] (May, 2005) and later confirmed in White Paper [81] (December, 2005) the economic 
profitability principle of legislative and enforcement processes. 
 
2.1.5 Post-crisis development 
 
2.1.5.1 De Larosier report 
 
The last financial crisis of 2008-2009 revealed the necessity of preventing systemic risks committed by failure of large 
financial institutions which used to be reputed ‘too big to fail’. Thus, this crisis showed the lack of global regulation and 
international cooperation of national authorities to diminish systemic risk and to terminate ‘too big to fail’ problem. In 
response to this situation, on 29th February 2009, the Committee under Jacques de Larosier chairmanship published a 
report [82] in which measures necessary to maintain financial stability at the global and European levels were suggested. 
In Europe, it was proposed to create a pan-European body that would coordinate activity of national supervisors. In turn, 
national regulators would execute the main obligation of direct supervision in their states. However, the UK government 
expressed disagreement against establishing of banking supervision body at the EU level [83]. Nevertheless, following 
the de Larosiere recommendations, on 23 September 2009, the Commission issued legislative measures to identify and 
prevent the systemic crisis in whole Europe (‘macro-prudential supervision’) and measures to update the regulation of 
individual market participants (‘micro-prudential supervision’) [84]. Thus, in 2010 a European System of Financial 
Supervision was organized. Functions of this organization were allocated among three separate bodies: the European 
Securities and Market Authority [85], the European Banking Authority (EBA) [86], the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) [87].  
Before the crisis, the Commission did not planning any measures for regulation of activities of credit rating 
agencies and financial analysts, the requirements to the offer documents to purchase and the required minimum capital 
of market participants [88]. However, the crisis brought its corrections in relation to these matters. In particular, the issue 
of regulation of rating agencies raised in April 2002. Nevertheless, in April 2006 the Commission decided that there was 
no need of changing regulations of these agencies. The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
deemed that self-regulation is the most suitable for rating agencies. However, the crisis showed that uncontrolled rating 
agencies played their negative role in wrong assessment of credit risks. Due to significance of rating agencies in global 
securities and banking markets, information of which were used by financial institutions for calculating risks in their 
investment activity, the European community realized the need of changing of credit ratings principles on the basis of 
integrity, transparency, responsibility and good governance in order to insure that agencies operate independently, 
objectively and produce reliable information [89]. 
For these reasons, to introduce prudential rules for rating agencies and to submit them to supervision, on 16 
September 2009 the European Parliament and the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 on credit rating 
agencies. In subsequent years, with the aim of preventing financial crises and promoting financial stability, the 
Commission constantly proposes measures to update this Regulation. Based on these proposals, the Regulation shifts to 
the direction of more centralization of supervision at the European level in the ESMA competence and ensuring more 
transparency of credit rating agencies activities [90], of introducing of civil liability for incorrect information provided and 
more tough measures for discloser of these agencies [91]. In the last amendment, Regulation (EU) No.462/2013 [92], 
taking into account bias position of rating agencies towards big financial institutions, the subject matter was changed by 
adding the concept the avoidance of conflicts of interest [93], in other words the conflicts between consumer and SIFI. 
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2.1.5.2 Modernization of framework directives 
 
The 2008-2009 financial crisis exposed weaknesses in four framework Directives: Market Abuse Directive (MAD), 
Prospectus Directive (PD), The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) and Transparency Directive (TD). 
These acts adopted in 2003-2004 in other financial and economical circumstances were not adjusted to new conditions. 
Particularly, these acts had insufficient regulatory ability, undeveloped investigative capability and sanctioning powers. 
Moreover, regulations on national level were not enough harmonized. In connection with the foregoing, the Commission, 
consulted with CESR and the European Securities Markets Expert Group (ESME), proposed measures to modernize 
framework Directives. Later, in 2010, the European Parliament adopted Directive 2010/73/EU [94] with strong intention to 
improve investors’ protection. Further, as MAD amendment [95], the Commission proposed to introduce administrative 
and criminal responsibility for committing insider dealing and market manipulation [96]. Nevertheless, the existing MAD, in 
the case of adopting by Parliament and the Council, will be replaced not earlier than 2015. 
The next proposal [97] is related to TD and aimed to reduce administrative barriers for small and medium-sized 
financial institutions, as well as harmonization of the notification mode of large financial groups. However, practically, this 
proposal can be implemented not earlier than 2014. Also, the Commission proposed to update MiFID 2004/39/EC [98]. 
The main emphasis is made on insufficient regulation of the derivatives circulation, which in turn contributed to the 
development of the recent financial crisis. The financial meltdown has also highlighted the danger to the stability of the 
financial system of short sales. In this regard, to reduce systemic risk by increasing transparency, the Commission 
adopted Regulation No.236/2012 [99]. Further, taking into account that derivatives, especially OTC derivatives, also 
contributed to the ‘swelling’ of the financial ‘bubble’, the Commission adopted Regulation 648/2012 [100]. This Regulation 




Conclusively, setting down strict requirements in respect of professional participants and in relation to the procedure of 
conducting their operations in the financial markets, the state tries to ensure stable development of the national market. 
This issue is again in agenda, because the global financial crisis that began in 2008 has demonstrated that it is 
uncontrollable and reckless actions of market participants that led to severe economic consequences of global level. For 
this reason, strengthening of state regulation became imperative. However, it means not only increasing its scope, the 
number of rules or prohibitions and restrictions; but, the transformation of the state regulation mechanism from micro-
prudential to macro-prudential that would prevent mistakes and problems leading to the systemic crisis. It seems that 
established supervisory bodies will be able to contribute to identifying and mitigating systemic risk. However, the results 
will be known only after stress-testing of the new systems.  
In addition, it is worth to remember that the financial world is developing and can present new challenges. That is 
why new supervisory bodies should be flexible and capable to predict changes in the financial world. Moreover, the 
effectiveness of regulation depends primarily not on the degree of centralization or self-regulation, but mostly on 
philosophy of macro-prudential analysis and adopted on this basis administrative decision, that is the construction of the 
so-called "smart regulation". Such regulation should take into account the new systemic characteristics of financial 
markets and the major players of this market SIFIs. However, SIFIs are not only conventional banks, but also institutions 
engaged in banking activities, ‘shadow banks’, contributing to the growth in the number and severity of systemic crises in 
the economy and lead the modern global financial system into chaos and uncertainty. Thus, foregoing factors influence 
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